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DAIMLERCHRYSLER V. CUNO: AN ESCAPE FROM THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE QUAGMIRE?
I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2003, Philip Morris, America's largest cigarette
maker, announced that it was moving its corporate headquarters
from New York City to Richmond, Virginia.' The company re-
sisted offers for relocation for nearly ten years, but a renewed and
vigorous recruitment effort by Virginia Governor Mark R. Warner
and local economic development officials persuaded the company
to leave New York City.2 Philip Morris hoped to bring an esti-
mated 450 employees to Richmond.' Philip Morris's relocation to
Richmond was a blockbuster deal for both the company and the
region.4 The company planned to invest nearly $50 million for
construction on new buildings and $250 million on machinery and
tools.' Convincing Philip Morris to move its corporate executives
1. John Reid Blackwell, Tobacco Town, USA; Philip Morris USA Will Move its NYC
Headquarters Here in June, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 5, 2003, at Al.
2. See Bob Rayner, Wooing Started in 1994; Warner Reignited Philip Morris Effort,
RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 2003, at Al.
3. Blackwell, supra note 1, at Al. At the time of the announcement, Philip Morris
already employed nearly 6800 people in the Richmond area. Id. By the end of 2003, nearly
forty percent of the company's 680 New York City employees had decided to relocate with
the company to Richmond. See John Reid Blackwell, 'Big Fish in a Smaller Pond; Philip
Morris USA Employees Move into New Headquarters, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 15,
2003, at D14.
4. Philip Morris estimated that it would save more than $60 million per year by mov-
ing its headquarters to Richmond. Blackwell, supra note 3, at D14. A significant amount of
the savings would come from its real estate deal. See Terry Pristin, Philip Morris USA
Starts its Move to a Historic Building, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2003, at C5. Philip Morris
gave up its Park Avenue address for a four-story, 250,000 square foot building on West
Broad Street. Id. In 2001, the University of Richmond purchased the building from the
Alcoa Corporation. Id. From the time the university purchased the building until Philip
Morris moved, the building had been unoccupied. See id. Although the financial figures
were not disclosed, it has been estimated that Philip Morris paid the University of Rich-
mond between $16-$18 per square foot for its new office building, a paltry sum compared
to $59 per square foot, the average rate for good office space in midtown Manhattan. See
id.; Blackwell, supra note 1, at Al.
5. Blackwell, supra note 1, at Al.
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out of the glitz and glamour of New York City came at a cost,
however. In return, Virginia state and local governments pro-
vided millions of dollars of incentives and tax credits for Philip
Morris's move. The Governor's Opportunity Fund6 gave Philip
Morris a $3 million grant, while the Virginia Investment Part-
nership Grant7 supplied $25 million dollars paid in annual in-
stallments if the company met certain performance criteria.8 In
addition to the state grants, the City of Richmond offered $2 mil-
lion in incentives, while Henrico County offered $1 million.9
Philip Morris could also take advantage of a host of state and lo-
cal tax credits designed to encourage economic development
within the state. 10 Furthermore, state officials estimated the av-
erage salary of the 450 employees that Philip Morris planned to
bring to Richmond at $133,000.1 The Commonwealth traded mil-
lions of dollars of tax revenue and grants for an expansion of in-
dustry within the state and several high-paying jobs.
Philip Morris's move was one of many recent examples of cor-
porations taking advantage of millions of dollars of grants, tax
credits, and other monetary incentives that state and local gov-
ernments have offered companies to expand or relocate within
their borders. 2 In an increasingly competitive marketplace,
6. To be eligible for the Fund, "projects must receive a minimum amount of private
investment and create a minimum number of jobs, depending on the size of the locality in
which the applicant business is located." Virginia Department of Business Assistance,
Governor's Opportunity Fund, http://www.dba.state.va.us/financing/crd/program.asp?PRO
GRAM_ID=24 (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
7. As with the Governor's Opportunity Fund, the governor has the final say over
whether to authorize the grant. The grants are "paid in five equal annual installments,
beginning in the fourth year after the capital investment and job creation are completed,
or in the third year if the company is locating in a fiscally distressed area of the state."
VIRGINIA ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP, A GUIDE TO BUSINESS INCENTIVES:
2005-2006, 17, available at http://www.yesvirginia.org/pdf/guides/4575-BusInc2005.pdf.
8. Blackwell, supra note 1, at Al.
9. Id. Officials also created a special enterprise zone to make Philip Morris eligible
for incentives available in the state, such as tax credits through the Virginia Department
of Housing and Community Development. See Pristin, supra note 4, at C5.
10. For a description of the tax incentives available on a statewide level in Virginia,
see Virginia Economic Development Partnership, supra note 7, at 5-7.
11. Blackwell, supra note 1, at Al. Taken as a whole, officials estimated that the deal
reached between Philip Morris and the Commonwealth could result in as many as 2000
new jobs. See id.
12. Last November, Nissan North America and Tennessee reached a deal that gave
the carmaker $197 million in state and local tax incentives for moving from California to
the Volunteer state. The package was so large and out of the ordinary that the state en-
acted special legislation to make it happen. For example, Nissan will be the recipient of
new tax credits aimed at compensating the company for its moving expenses. See Bush
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states have sought to increase their arsenal of options available
to induce companies into expanding or staying at home. While the
range of incentives offered may vary from locality to locality,
nearly all states offer some type of incentives for economic in-
vestment. 3 As Professor Walter Hellerstein, the nation's preemi-
nent scholar in the field of constitutional limitations on state
taxation, noted, "[sicarcely a day passes without some state offer-
ing yet another incentive to spur economic development." 4 Al-
though tax incentives have become commonplace in the world of
economic development, the policy of offering companies tax
breaks and credits is not without its critics. The criticism
launched at economic incentives, specifically tax breaks, is pri-
marily two-fold: economic and legal.
Critics of tax incentives argue that there are a host of reasons
why the pervasive use of such incentives is a fiscally unsound
practice. One complaint is that the current system allows public
officials to unfairly pick and choose which companies and projects
will receive millions of dollars of aid.' Others argue that such tax
breaks allow states to relinquish millions of dollars of corporate
tax revenue that could be spent to both improve the lives of state
residents and improve a state's ability to compete in the market-
place.' 6 Perhaps the most basic criticism of the broad use of tax
Bernard, Nissan Deal New Benchmark, Economic Developers Say, THE TENNESSEAN, Dec.
4, 2005, at 3A.
13. According to one estimate made in February 2005, nearly forty states offered such
incentives. See Bill King, The War Against Incentives Rages On, Expansion Management
Online (Feb. 14, 2005), available at http://www.expansionmanagement.com/smo/article
viewer/default.asp?cmd=articledetail&articleid=1
6 3 5 3 &st=2 . However, this figure is likely
a conservative one since it is increasingly seen as bad policy not to offer businesses tax in-
centives to relocate or expand business within one's state.
14. Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Busi-
ness Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 790 (1996).
15. For example, in Virginia, where the governor can exercise discretion over which
companies or projects can receive financial aid out of the Governor's Opportunity Fund
and the Virginia Investment Partnership Grant, supporters of a new baseball stadium for
the Richmond Braves, the city's minor league baseball team, questioned why state and
local officials balked at the opportunity to offer tax incentives to help build a new home for
the team while those same officials aggressively wooed NASCAR with a multimillion dol-
lar incentive package to make Richmond the home of the racing league's hall of fame. See
Scott Bass, Illegal Bait? The Latest in Business Lures: Tax Incentives may be Unconstitu-
tional, STYLE WKLY., Aug. 31, 2005, available at http://www.styleweekly.com/article.asp?
idarticle=10880. Ultimately, Richmond was not selected for the hall of fame site. See Greg
Engle, NASCAR Narrows it Down, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 6, 2006.
16. See MICHAEL MAZEROV, CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, SHOULD
CONGRESS AUTHORIZE STATES TO CONTINUE GING TAX BREAKS TO BUSINESSES? 2 (2005),
available at http://www.cbpp.org/2-18-05sfp.pdf ("[T]he loss of revenue is impairing the
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incentives is that they are not nearly as vital to the creation of
jobs and growth of business as proponents of tax incentives be-
lieve. 7 Opponents of tax incentives claim that "no business execu-
tive worth his salt will make a location decision based on state
tax incentives.""8 They claim that other factors, such as an edu-
cated workforce, geographic location, 9 and transportation infra-
structure are equally or more important than tax incentives in
business decision-making. 20 Regardless of the effectiveness of tax
ability of states to fund education, infrastructure improvements, worker retraining, and
other public services that make a vital contribution to healthy state economies and a pro-
ductive national economy.").
17. In his analysis of the research conducted examining the relationship between
state taxes, incentives, and their effect on economic development, Robert G. Lynch found
that
the evidence fails to support the claim that growing the economy requires
shrinking the public sector and reducing taxes. In particular, there is little
evidence that state and local tax cuts-when paid for by reducing public ser-
vices-stimulate economic activity or create jobs. There is evidence, however,
that increases in taxes, when used to expand the quantity and quality of pub-
lic services, can promote economic development and employment growth.
ROBERT G. LYNCH, RETHINKING GROWTH STRATEGIES: How STATE AND LOCAL TAXES AND
SERVICES AFFECT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, at vii (2004), available at http://www.epin
et.org/books/rethinking.growth_(full).pdf.
18. David Brunori, The Politics of State Taxation: Helping States to Hurt Themselves,
STATE TAx TODAY, June 6, 2005, available at 2005 STT 107-5 (LEXIS).
19. In its pitch for the NASCAR Hall of Fame, Henrico County officials touted Rich-
mond's geographic location as one of the most important reasons to build the shrine there.
According to a press release issued by Henrico County, "[m]ore than 50% of the U.S. popu-
lation is within a one-day drive of Richmond and the area has an excellent, easy-to-
navigate highway system and an international airport. Major attractions 100 miles away
or less include Washington D.C., Virginia Beach, Williamsburg and the Blue Ridge Moun-
tains." Press Release, Henrico County Submits Letter of Intent for Richmond Area to Land
NASCAR Hall of Fame, available at http://www.rir.com/news/news.jsp?news-id=151.
In the end, NASCAR selected the city of Charlotte, North Carolina, as the site of its
Hall of Fame. The Hall of Fame will cost Mecklenburg County approximately $107 mil-
lion. Of that amount, $102 million will be raised though an increase in the local hotel tax.
See Bob Rayner and John Markon, Why City Lost 1 Bid but Won Another; In Seeking
NASCAR Hall, MeadWestvaco, Long-Term Ties Crucial, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 12,
2006, at B1. After losing the race for the NASCAR Hall of Fame, the city bounced back
with the announcement that MeadWestvaco, a Fortune 500 packaging company, would
relocate from Connecticut to Richmond. Id. ("The state promised $6 million in incentive
grants, based on the company meeting investment and employment goals. It also offeredjob training that could cost about $700,000. To put those incentives in perspective, Mead-
Westvaco has a market value of about $4.8 billion. The state incentives are worth about
one-seventh of 1 percent of the company's total value.").
20. In light of the anti-smoking climate created by New York City's fiscal and social
policies, it was no surprise that Philip Morris chose to leave Manhattan, regardless of how
much the company claimed that a move to Virginia was too financially appealing to pass
up. At the time the company announced its move, New York and Virginia had drastically
different taxes on cigarettes: New York's tax climbed to $1.50 per pack while Virginia's tax
remained the lowest in the nation at 2.5 cents per pack. Blackwell, supra note 1, at Al.
Commentators also believe the company was blowing smoke when it denied that New
1232 [Vol. 40:1229
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incentives or the questionable role they play in business decision-
making, tax incentives have proliferated across the nation. In this
age of outsourcing, politicians face immense pressure to keep jobs
at home, and when new jobs are created, they are quick to associ-
ate themselves with job growth. Therefore, it can be expected that
politicians and the state tax analysts who work for them are re-
sistant to limiting incentives or any other tools that may help
their state compete for jobs with other states. Unsurprisingly, op-
ponents of tax incentives have been unsuccessful, thus far, in
convincing state legislatures to forego these tax credits.
Finding their arguments to be unpopular in statehouses across
the country, opponents of tax incentives have taken their battle to
the courts. In recent years, lower courts have wrestled with ques-
tions about the constitutionality of several economic incentives.2'
This battle has now reached the Supreme Court, which heard oral
arguments for DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno22 on March 1,
2006.23 In Cuno, the Supreme Court will consider whether the
York City's smoking ban, one that forbids Philip Morris employees from lighting up in
their offices, played any role in its decision to leave Manhattan. See, e.g., Nancy Dillon,
Philip Morris to Quit City: Mayor's Smoking Ban Seen Behind Va. Move, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 4, 2003, at 27.
21. See, e.g., Pelican Chapter, Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards,
128 F.3d 910 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that Louisiana property tax exemption for a new, or
addition to an existing, manufacturing establishment violated the dormant Commerce
Clause because eligibility for the exemption required manufacturers and contractors to
employ eighty percent in-state workers and use eighty percent in-state materials); GMC v.
Dir. of Revenue, 981 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1998) (holding that Missouri law that allowed com-
panies and their subsidiaries to file consolidated income tax returns only if fifty percent or
more of its income had come from sources within Missouri violated the Commerce Clause);
Worldcorp v. Dep't of Taxation, 944 P.2d 824 (Nev. 1997) (striking down a statute that
gave air carriers headquartered in Nevada a sales and use tax exemption on its aircrafts
while denying the same for corporations headquartered outside of the state).
22. 126 S. Ct. 36 (2005).
23. In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court asked the parties to present briefs for
an additional question: "Whether respondents have standing to challenge Ohio's invest-
ment tax credit, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.33." Id. Because Cuno involves several par-
ties, individuals and businesses, from two different states, the issue of standing is multi-
faceted. However, when adding into the equation that the respondents are taxpayers, the
standing question becomes even more complex. The circuits are split over the standard to
apply for grievances filed by state taxpayers against state laws in federal court. See Kris-
tin E. Hickman, How Did We Get Here Anyway? Considering the Standing Question in
DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 4 (forthcoming 2006), available at http:
Ilssrn.com/abstract=859784 (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). According to Professor Kristin E.
Hickman, the standing issue in Cuno comes down to whether the Supreme Court believes
that "states should be treated more like the federal government or like municipalities in
evaluating taxpayer standing." Id. Hickman predicts that the Supreme Court will rule
against the plaintiff taxpayers in Cuno under a standing analysis, ignoring the Commerce
Clause issue altogether. Id. at 30. For an analysis of the impact this result would have on
12332006]
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State of Ohio's Manufacturing Machinery & Equipment Invest-
ment Tax Credit ("investment tax credit" or "ITC"), which gives a
credit against a corporation's franchise or income tax depending
upon where the taxpayer installs new machinery in the state and
the size of the investment, violates the dormant Commerce
Clause.24 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit invalidated
the investment tax credit because it discriminated against inter-
state commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.25
The potential impact of this case goes well beyond the cities of
Toledo and Richmond.26 The Sixth Circuit's decision sent notice to
the thirty-seven states that offer similar credits that their tax in-
centives might now be in legal jeopardy.27 DaimlerChrysler Corp.
v. Cuno, which started out as a challenge against a state tax
credit, is now a case of national importance.
This comment examines Cuno and the impact the case may
have on the use of tax incentives under the dormant Commerce
this sort of litigation, see discussion infra Part VI.
If oral arguments serve as any indicator of the Court's position on an issue, the oral ar-
guments in Cuno would suggest that Professor Hickman might be correct. The Justices
spent a considerable amount of time grilling both parties on the question of standing. See
generally Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-15, 27-36, Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 36 (No. 04-1704),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/04-17
04.pdf [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument].
24. In lower courts, the cases were known as Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc. and Cuno
v. Wilkins. Here, the petitioner, William W. Wilkins, is Ohio's Tax Commissioner. The two
cases were consolidated. The question presented is "[wihether Ohio's investment tax
credit, Ohio Revised Code § 5733.33, which seeks to encourage economic development by
providing a credit to taxpayers who install new manufacturing machinery and equipment
in the State, violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution." Daimler-
Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, No. 04-1704, question presented (U.S. Sept. 27, 2005), available
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/04-01724qp.pdf.
25. See Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2004).
26. While companies that move to Richmond or expand their business in the city have
several tax incentives to choose from, it is important to note that the bulk of the Philip
Morris package was funded through grants, which is discussed in Part IV, are currently
constitutional. See discussion infra Part IV. The Virginia Enterprise Zone Program re-
ported that one business qualified for the state's investment tax credit in 2004. Since
2000, two businesses have received $3.04 million in investment tax credits while making
$1.38 billion in capital improvements and equipment expenditures and creating 2085 full
time jobs. VA. ENTERPRISE ZONE PROGRAM, VA. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT, 2004 TAx YEAR ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2004), available at http://www.
dhcd.virginia.gov/EZones/docs/2004_EZone_.ProgramReport.pdf.
27. Thirty-seven states base their investment tax credits upon capital investment
and/or job creation in the state. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-23-24 (LexisNexis 2000); CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE § 23649 (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.191 (West 2005); 35 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/201(f) (2005); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83a, § 5-1501 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
105-129.9 (2005); N.Y. TAX LAW § 210(12)(a) (Consol. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.1
(2001).
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Clause. Part II examines the Ohio Investment Tax Credit and the
facts that gave rise to the controversy in Cuno. Part III analyzes
the Supreme Court's relevant jurisprudence in the area of tax in-
centives and the dormant Commerce Clause. Part IV reviews the
Sixth Circuit's opinion in Cuno and analyzes whether the court
correctly followed Supreme Court precedent. Finally, Part V as-
sesses the ramifications on the dormant Commerce Clause and
tax incentives of a Supreme Court decision upholding or reversing
the Sixth Circuit.
II. THE OHIO INVESTMENT TAx CREDIT
In the summer of 1995, fearing a downturn in the economy, the
Ohio legislature hurried a bill through both of its chambers that
would encourage businesses to remain in the state by giving them
a tax credit for the purchase of new equipment and machinery.2"
In under a month after Senate Bill 188 was introduced, Governor
George Voinovich put the act into effect with his signature.29 The
move was seen as saving thousands of jobs and was widely
praised throughout the state.3" The investment tax credit works
as a nonrefundable credit against the state's corporate franchise
tax3 if the taxpayer "purchases new manufacturing machinery
and equipment during the qualifying period ... [and] the new
manufacturing machinery and equipment are installed in
[Ohio]." 32 The investment tax credit is 13.5% of the cost of the
new investment if it is purchased for use in "eligible areas" of the
county.3 Eligible areas include those designated as a "distressed
area, a labor surplus area, an inner city area, or a situational dis-
tress area."34 Otherwise, similar investments made in non-eligible
areas could receive an ITC of 7.5%." According to the Ohio De-
28. See Lee Leonard, Tax Credit Proposal is Sent to House After Senate's Approval,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 1, 1995, at 3C. Only four Ohio state senators voted against the
bill. Id. Interestingly, Toledo's representative was one of the four. See id.
29. See S.B. 188, 121st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1995).
30. See Editorial, Ohio Competes; Tax Credit is a Wise Investment in Jobs, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, July 26, 1995, at 10A.
31. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.01 (LexisNexis 2005).
32. Id. § 5733.33(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2005).
33. Id. § 5733.33 (C)(2) (LexisNexis 2005).
34. Id. § 5733.33(A)(9) (LexisNexis 2005). For an explanation of what constitutes each
type of eligible area, see id. § 5733.33(A)(8)-(13) (LexisNexis 2005).
35. See id. § 5733.33(C)(1) (LexisNexis 2005).
2006] 1235
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partment of Taxation, there were 2312 claims for the investment
tax credit in 2004, valued at $86.9 million. 36 The Ohio Depart-
ment of Development estimates that there have been more than
18,000 filings for the ITC since the credit was created in 1995."'
Figures from the Department of Development show that compa-
nies in Ohio have invested $34.2 billion in new machinery and
equipment, making them eligible for more than $2 billion in tax
credits.38 When the tax credit was introduced, opponents of the
ITC argued that giving away $300 million over thirteen years was
too large a sacrifice, 39 and it is clear that the credit has already
exceeded those estimates.
In July 1997, the Chrysler Corporation announced that it
planned on spending nearly $1.2 billion to build a Jeep assembly
plant and revamp an existing factory in Toledo, Ohio.4° Chrysler
considered leaving the industrial city for another location and
taking its 5500 employees with it.4 Under considerable pressure
from Toledo residents42 and facing competition from bordering
Michigan, city and state officials offered Chrysler an estimated
$232 million incentive package to stay in Toledo.43 Millions of dol-
lars of tax revenue was not the only thing that Toledo and its
residents gave up in the deal. When DaimlerChrysler" and the
City of Toledo finalized their agreement in 1998, officials esti-
36. OHIO DEP'T OF TAXATION, Tax Data Series: Corporation Franchise Tax
(2005), available at http://tax.ohio.gov/divisions/tax-analysis/tax-dataseries/corporation-
franchise/cfcredit/documents/cf-creditsty04.pdf.
37. Economic Development and the Dormant Commerce Clause: The Lessons of Cuno
v. DaimlerChrysler and its Effect on State Taxation Affecting Interstate Commerce: Joint
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 6 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of the Honorable Bruce Johnson, Lieuten-
ant Governor of Ohio).
38. Id.
39. See Editorial, supra note 30, at 10A.
40. Robyn Meredith, Chrysler Wins Incentives From Toledo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
1997, at D3.
41. See id. While the city's incentive package persuaded the company to stay, Chrys-
ler announced that the new plant would only require the employ of 4900 people. See id.
42. Perhaps no city official was more dedicated to seeing Chrysler stay than Toledo
Mayor Carty Finkbeiner: "Had we lost Jeep, it would be like Detroit losing the Tigers. It
would be like the Yankees leaving New York,' Finkbeiner said. 'We don't have a major-
league sports team. Jeep is a major part of our identity.'" John Seewer, Jeep Runs Over
Toledo Homes Neighborhood, AKRON BEACON J., May 24, 1999, at B5.
43. Meredith, supra note 40, at D3.
44. The Chrysler Corporation and Daimler-Benz merged in the summer of 1998. See
Ted Evanoff, Chrysler Will Merge with Daimler-Benz; Move Likely Means Prestige, Greater
European Sales for U.S. Automaker, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 7, 1998, at IA.
1236 [Vol. 40:1229
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mated that the incentive package was worth $280 million,45
nearly $50 million more than initially expected. In the agree-
ment, Toledo and two local school districts would give Daimler-
Chrysler a ten-year, one-hundred percent property tax exemption
and an investment tax credit of 13.5% "against the state corpo-
rate franchise tax for certain qualifying investments."46 To build
the new plant, DaimlerChrysler needed land occupied by eighty-
three homeowners and sixteen businesses in a Toledo neighbor-
hood.47 While some property owners left willingly, the city was
forced to initiate eminent domain proceedings against the other
owners to condemn their property.4" This grabbed the attention of
45. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2004).
46. Id.
47. Lisa Brennan, Toledo 'Taken' With Jeep Suit, THE NAT'L L.J., Jan. 25, 1999, at Al.
48. Id. Although controversial, exercising the Fifth Amendment's power of eminent
domain to promote economic development was a common practice when Chrysler and
Toledo reached their deal. See Steven E. Buckingham, The Kelo Threshold: Private Prop-
erty and Public Use Reinstated, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1279, 1293-1305 (2005). Last year, in
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), the Supreme Court heard a lawsuit
brought by nine property owners against the city of New London, Connecticut to stop the
condemnation of their homes, which was required by the city's development plan aimed at
creating jobs and increasing tax revenue. Id. at 2658-60. The Court considered the ques-
tion of whether taking private land to promote economic development was a public use
under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 2661. The Court answered:
the necessity and wisdom of using eminent domain to promote economic de-
velopment are certainly matters of legitimate public debate. This Court's au-
thority, however, extends only to determining whether the City's proposed
condemnations are for a "public use" within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution. Because over a century of our case law in-
terpreting that provision dictates an affirmative answer to that question, we
may not grant petitioners the relief that they seek.
Id. at 2668. Although the power to tax and the power to take involve two different provi-
sions of the Constitution, Kelo and the fight against tax incentives involve one fundamen-
tal question-how far can a state go in the name of economic development?
The Kelo decision created an uproar in communities and legislative chambers across
America. In November, the House of Representatives, by a margin of 376 to 38, passed a
bill that would forbid state officials from using federal funds to pay for economic develop-
ment projects if eminent domain was involved. See Private Property Rights Protection Act,
H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005). Also, this year, it is expected that nearly half of state leg-
islatures will debate new laws designed to curb Kelo. See Jennifer Bradley, Property
Wrongs; In Kelo's Wake, a Raft of Anti-Regulatory Initiatives from the Right, THE AM.
PROSPECT, Jan. 2006, at 16. Some opponents of tax incentives have tried to harness the
Kelo backlash to support their cause, arguing that tax incentive packages like the one of-
fered by Toledo have essentially the same detrimental effect on communities that takings
do. See, e.g., Robert D. Plattner, New London and Its Aftermath: A Lesson for State Tax
Policymakers, STATE TAX TODAY, Aug. 29, 2005, at 679, available at 2005 STT 166-7
(LEXIS) ("In the name of economic development, the states are using tax policy to intrude
in their economies as never before, violating basic principles of the free market and tax
policy and too often granting favorable tax treatment to those with power and influence at
the expense of the general welfare. The best that can be said for those tax policies is that
20061 1237
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consumer advocate Ralph Nader, who helped angry Toledo tax-
payers file a lawsuit against the plan in December 1999.49 A
group of eighteen plaintiffs from Ohio and Michigan filed suit in
state court against the City of Toledo, the State of Ohio, the two
school districts involved in the agreement, and several govern-
ment officials.5" The plaintiffs alleged that the property tax ex-
emption and the investment tax credit violated the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Ohio Constitution.5' The defendants removed
the case to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss.52 The dis-
trict court held that there were no violations of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Ohio Constitution53 and dismissed the remain-
ing counts of the complaint alleging violation of the Commerce
Clause.54 The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Before reviewing the Sixth Circuit's opinion, it is necessary to
analyze the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of dis-
crimination and the dormant Commerce Clause, a field of law
that has been, perhaps justifiably, described as a "mess"55 and a
"quagmire."56 The Commerce Clause of the Constitution states
people don't lose their homes as a consequence. That is hardly justification for their con-
tinuation, however.").
49. See Lisa Brennan, Toledo Tax Breaks Battled, THE NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1999, at
A6.
50. The Michigan plaintiffs argued that had the tax incentives not been available,
DaimlerChrysler would have built its new facilities in Michigan, giving Michigan, its mu-
nicipalities, and its residents the tax revenue and job growth that would have been created
with the new Jeep plant. See Hickman, supra note 23, at 6.
51. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1201-02. The district court found that the Equal Protection Clause was sat-
isfied since there was a "rational nexus" between the exemption and credit and the legiti-
mate state interest "to encourage industrial investment and development in Ohio." Id.
54. Id. at 1203-04. The merits of the plaintiffs' Commerce Clause argument will be
addressed in Part IV's review of the Sixth Circuit's opinion. See discussion infra Part IV.
55. Hearing, supra note 37, at 15 (statement of Professor Walter Hellerstein).
56. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
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that Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce ...
among the several States."57 Although nowhere stated in the Con-
stitution, the doctrine, which proposes that a negative, or dor-
mant, aspect of the Commerce Clause gives the judiciary the abil-
ity to review state economic regulation, began to develop as early
as the Marshall and Taney Courts."8 Gibbons v. Ogden is seen as
the original dormant Commerce Clause case, but it was in the
landmark decisions of Case of the State Freight Tax59 and State
Tax on Railway Gross Receipts6" that the Court "unequivocally
announced and squarely applied the doctrine that the Commerce
Clause by its own force limits state tax power over interstate
commerce."6 While these decisions affirmed that the Court was
willing to invalidate state tax laws that discriminated against in-
terstate commerce, some state taxes on interstate commerce re-
mained constitutional. 2 For the next one hundred years, the Su-
preme Court tussled with different standards of review and tests
in cases that involved challenges to state tax policies.63
In 1977, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Com-
plete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,64 which provided a four-prong
test to determine the validity, under the Commerce Clause, of a
tax on interstate commerce. 5 In Complete Auto Transit, the Court
assessed whether a Mississippi tax on an out-of-state manufac-
turer's automobiles for the "privilege of... doing business" within
the state violated the Commerce Clause.66 The Complete Auto
Transit test asks four questions: (1) Does the tax apply to an ac-
tivity that has a substantial nexus with the state?; (2) Is the tax
fairly apportioned to activities conducted by the taxpayer in the
state?; (3) Does the tax discriminate against interstate com-
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
58. See WALTER HELLERSTEIN, TAX MANAGEMENT MULTISTATE TAX PORTFOLIOS,
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE TAXATION, 1400:0005-:0009 (2005).
59. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 232, 282 (1872) (holding that a Pennsylvania tax imposed
on freight carried in the state was a regulation of commerce national in nature and there-
fore unconstitutional).
60. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284 (1872) (holding that a Pennsylvania tax on freight receipts
did not violate the Commerce Clause because it was not a tax on the freight but on the
property held by a corporation).
61. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 58, at 1400:0006.
62. See id. at 1400:0005-:0008.
63. See id. at 1400:0005-:0010.
64. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
65. See id. at 277-78.
66. Id. at 274.
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merce?; and (4) Is the tax fairly related to services provided by
the state?
67
While all of the prongs of the Complete Auto Transit test are
important and interrelated, the prong that asks whether the tax
discriminates against interstate commerce is critical to the reso-
lution of cases like Cuno. Prior to Cuno, the Supreme Court had
several opportunities to review state tax provisions to determine
the bounds of nondiscrimination. The cases below define the
Court's position on state tax incentives and the dormant Com-
merce Clause.
B. Supreme Court Precedent
1. The Boston Stock Exchange Case
In Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,6" the Su-
preme Court considered whether an amendment to New York's
tax on securities transactions was constitutional.69 In 1968, the
New York legislature responded to increased competition from
regional stock exchanges in places like Los Angeles and Chicago
by increasing the tax rate on securities transactions involving
out-of-state sales.7" Since 1905, New York utilized a levy-a
transfer tax--on securities transactions if part of the transaction
happened within the state.71 Moreover, the states in which the
petitioners, competing stock exchanges, were located did not tax
the sale or transfer of securities. 72 New York tweaked the transfer
tax so that transactions, delivery or transfer of security sale, oc-
curring in-state, had a lower tax burden than those occurring out-
of-state.73 Specifically, if a nonresident wanted to sell a security
67. Id. at 277-78. For background on the application of the Complete Auto Transit
test, see HELLERSTEIN, supra note 58, at 1400:0010-:0022a.
68. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
69. Id. at 319.
70. Id. Competition from the other exchanges increased by seventy-three percent in
the two years before the New York transfer tax was amended. Id. at 325 n.7.
71. Id. at 319. New York recognized that improvements in technology, especially in
the area of communication, aided the establishment of regional stock exchanges. New
York had a near monopoly on stock transfers, but these improvements in technology
meant that it would be easier for investors scattered across the nation to use regional
stock exchanges rather than rely on the New York Stock Exchange. See id. at 328 n. 10.
72. Id. at 323.
73. Id. at 324.
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on the New York Stock Exchange, he would get a fifty percent de-
crease on the tax rate with a $350 maximum tax liability for a
single transaction.74 On the other hand, if the nonresident opted
to sell on an out-of-state exchange, a higher transfer tax applied
and there was no limitation on total tax liability.75 Finding that
residents increasingly used out-of-state exchanges, the amend-
ment was structured to encourage residents to use the New York
Stock Exchange, "foreclos[ing] tax-neutral decisions."76
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the amended transfer
tax discriminated against interstate commerce because the "obvi-
ous effect of the tax is to extend a financial advantage to sales on
the New York exchanges at the expense of regional exchanges."77
The Court restated its position that "[a] State may no more use
discriminatory taxes to assure that nonresidents direct their
commerce to businesses within the State than to assure that resi-
dents trade only in intrastate commerce."78 While striking down a
state tax aimed at promoting the New York economy, the Court
noted that its decision "does not prevent the States from structur-
ing their tax systems to encourage the growth and development of
intrastate commerce and industry."79 Boston Exchange provided
the states with an example of an impermissible tax, but the Court
did not provide them with any additional guidance on how to
structure constitutional tax credits.8 °
2. The Westinghouse Electric Corporation Case
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully81 presented the Supreme
Court with another question concerning the constitutionality of
an income tax credit. The New York legislature enacted a tax
credit in response to the changes Congress made to the Internal
74. 429 U.S. at 324.
75. Id. at 324-25.
76. Id. at 331.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 334-35.
79. Id. at 336.
80. Walter Hellerstein commented that Boston Exchange-despite its pronouncement
that some taxes could be arranged to encourage economic development-left open to inter-
pretation the concept that all tax incentives were unconstitutional since a business offered
the incentive would not consider only non-tax criteria in a business decision. Hellerstein &
Coenen, supra note 14, at 795-96.
81. 466 U.S. 388, 389 (1984).
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Revenue Code when it passed the Revenue Act of 1971.82 In that
bill, Congress created a special corporate entity called the "Do-
mestic International Sales Corporation" or "DISC." 3 Congress
amended the Code in order to aid American firms in increasing
their exports by providing them with tax incentives.84 Since the
measure precluded a DISC's income from being taxed, New York,
which ordinarily would have incorporated the DISC tax scheme
into its laws, would have lost between $20-$30 million annually
in tax revenue if it followed the federal scheme." There was fear
that taxing DISCs would both discourage the companies from
forming in New York and also suppress the production of export
goods within the state.86 The New York legislature drafted legis-
lation that was designed to achieve two things: (1) consolidate the
income of the DISC with the income of its parent for state tax
purposes and; (2) provide a partial franchise tax credit to the par-
ent company by lowering the tax rate to thirty percent on DISC
income as reflected in consolidated return.87 However, the maxi-
mum credit was adjusted according to the ratio of exports the
DISC shipped from New York compared to the number shipped
from outside the state. 8 Thus, the more business activity the
DISC conducted in-state, the greater the incentive it would rec-
ognize from the State of New York.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation
that conducted business in New York, was the parent company of
Westinghouse Electric Export, which generated revenue entirely
from export sales.8 9 In 1973, Westinghouse Electric's tax report
did not include all of its DISC's income on its consolidated tax re-
turns. 90 Westinghouse Electric and the New York Tax Commis-
sion disputed over the correct tax determination, and when the
disagreement could not be resolved through administrative ap-
peals, Westinghouse Electric brought suit, claiming that "the tax
benefit of the DISC export credit to gross receipts from shipments
82. Id. at 390.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 392. In New York, a subsidiary company is taxed directly, not on its distri-
butions received by a parent from the subsidiary. Id.
86. 429 U.S. at 392-93.
87. Id. at 393.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 394.
90. Id. at 395.
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attributable to a New York place of business violated the Com-
merce, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses."91
A unanimous Supreme Court agreed with Westinghouse Elec-
tric. Although the Court agreed with the New York Tax Commis-
sion that the state's allocation formula was constitutional, it held
that the tax credit scheme violated the Commerce Clause because
it gave an incentive to a company to conduct more business in the
state while it "penalize[d] increases in the DISC's shipping activi-
ties in other States."92 The Court reaffirmed the central tenet of
Boston Exchange that a tax is discriminatory when it "diverts
new business into the State or merely prevents current business
from being diverted elsewhere."93 Though it struck down another
tax credit that was created to promote economic activity within a
state, the Supreme Court maintained once again that states were
free to compete among themselves for business, but doing so at
the cost of discriminating against interstate commerce was anti-
thetical to the Commerce Clause's position against protection-
ism.94
91. 429 U.S. at 395-96.
92. Id. at 400-01.
93. Id. at 406.
94. See id. at 406 n.12. Later that year, the Supreme Court held that a Hawaiian tax
exemption violated the Commerce Clause because it saved certain Hawaii-produced liq-
uors from the twenty percent excise tax that applied to other liquors made outside the
state. The Supreme Court found the exemption unconstitutional for the same reasons that
it found the credits in Boston Stock Exchange and Westinghouse infirm-the measure had
the purpose and effect of discriminating in favor of local products over out-of-state ones.
See Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 273 (1984).
Unlike Boston Stock Exchange and Westinghouse, however, the decision was far from
unanimous. Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, and O'Connor dissented, arguing that the
Twenty-First Amendment precluded the Court from striking down the tax exemption. Id.
at 287 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to the dissenters, Supreme Court jurisprudence
established that the Twenty-First Amendment "confers power upon the States to regulate
commerce in intoxicating liquors unconfined by ordinary limitations imposed on state
regulation of interstate goods by the Commerce Clause and other constitutional provi-
sions." Id. at 281 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Last year, the Supreme Court reexamined the constitutional conflict between the Com-
merce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment. In Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885
(2005), the Supreme Court considered a challenge to New York and Michigan state laws
that allowed their residents to directly purchase wine from in-state wineries while requir-
ing out-of-state wineries to sell through an in-state wholesaler before their products could
reach consumers. Id. at 1891-92. In a five-to-four decision, the Court again held that the
Commerce Clause trumped the Twenty-First Amendment. Id. at 1907. With Justice Tho-
mas, writing one of the case's two dissents, Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Rehnquist
renewed their argument that the Twenty-First Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon Act
barred the application of the Commerce Clause. See id. at 1910 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Allowing States to regulate the direct shipment of liquor was of "clear con-
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3. The New Energy Company Case
Before Cuno, the Supreme Court's most recent challenge to a
state tax credit came in New Energy Company of Indiana v. Lim-
bach.95 In New Energy, the Supreme Court reviewed a provision
in the Ohio code that gave fuel dealers a tax credit for each gallon
of ethanol sold against the state's motor fuel sales tax if that
ethanol was produced in Ohio or in another state that gave an in-
centive to Ohio-produced ethanol.96 An Indiana ethanol manufac-
turer brought suit against the state because it was not eligible for
the reciprocity following Indiana's switch from a tax exemption
for ethanol to a direct subsidy.97 Ohio argued that its policy was
not discriminatory but one that encouraged other states to enact
similar legislation.9" Although the Court stated that "reciprocity
requirements are not per se unlawful,"99 the Court, in a unani-
mous decision, struck down the tax credit, stating that "the
threat used to induce Indiana's acceptance is, in effect, taxing a
product made by its manufacturers at a rate higher than the
same product made by Ohio manufacturers."100
Furthermore, the Court settled the contention that a "[s]tate
may validate a statute that discriminates against interstate
commerce by showing that it advances a legitimate local purpose
that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscrimina-
tory alternatives."01 ' The Supreme Court stated that "the stan-
cern" to the framers of the Webb-Kenyon Act and the Twenty-first Amend-
ment. The driving force behind the passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act was a
desire to reverse this Court's decisions that had precluded States from regu-
lating the direct shipment of liquor by out-of-state interests .... [Tlhere is lit-
tle evidence that purely protectionist tax exemptions like those at issue in
Bacchus were of any concern to the framers of the Act and the Amendment.
Id. at 1924-25 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
95. 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
96. Id. at 271.
97. Id. at 272-73. Although not addressing the constitutionality of subsidies, the
Court stated that "[d]irect subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run
afoul" of the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 278. For an examination of the treatment
of subsidies under the dormant Commerce Clause, see discussion infra Part V.
98. 486 U.S. at 274.
99. Id. at 276 (citing Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) (holding that there was
no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment where New Jersey Automobile Law treated its
citizens differently than citizens from states who did not accept an offer of reciprocity)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 278.
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dards for such justification are high.' 10 2 Ohio advanced two argu-
ments as legitimate local purposes: (1) promoting ethanol, a com-
ponent of gasohol, would reduce harmful exhaust emissions and;
(2) providing a reciprocity condition would help persuade other
states to provide incentives for ethanol production as well.103 The
Court held that each of Ohio's arguments were "no more than im-
plausible speculation, which does not suffice to validate this plain
discrimination against products of [an] out-of-state manufac-
ture."0 4 Theoretically, there may be a situation where the Court
will uphold a discriminatory state statute or policy because of the
unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives, but it seems
very unlikely that such a situation will arise, especially with the
powers that state and local governments already have to promote
public health, safety, and welfare.
IV. CUNO v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER
A. The Sixth Circuit Opinion
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the lower
court's order that dismissed the plaintiffs challenge to the Ohio
ITC and personal property tax exemption.' 5 The court did not re-
view whether all prongs of the Complete Auto Transit test were
satisfied because the parties only placed discrimination against
interstate commerce at issue. 0 6 But the Sixth Circuit did thor-
oughly examine the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area.
Although the Sixth Circuit surmised that the Court "has never
precisely delineated the scope of the doctrine that bars discrimi-
natory taxes,"0 7 the court found that the dormant Commerce
Clause "rests on the distinction between laws that benefit in-state
activity and laws that burden out-of-state activity."' The State
of Ohio's position was that the Supreme Court's cases meant that
102. Id.; see also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) ("[Wlhere simple
economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity
has been erected.").
103. 486 U.S. at 279-80.
104. Id. at 280.
105. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 742 (6th Cir. 2004).
106. See id.
107. Id. at 743.
108. Id. at 745.
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tax incentives were unconstitutional only if they either imposed a
higher tax on out-of-state products or businesses or factored both
a business's out-of-state and in-state activities to calculate the
business's tax rate.'0 9 Under this broad but simple guideline, the
Sixth Circuit rejected Ohio's argument that Boston Stock Ex-
change and its progeny should be "read narrowly to hold that tax
incentives, like the Ohio tax credit, are permissible as long as
they do not penalize out-of-state economic activity.""' Ohio's ITC
gave in-state companies the option of reducing their corporate tax
by expanding their businesses in the state."' Conversely, in-state
companies could not take advantage of the investment tax credit
if they chose to expand outside of the state. Therefore, as the
Sixth Circuit stated, the Ohio ITC violated the Commerce Clause
because it coerced companies to conduct more business in the
state."2
Although not at issue before the Supreme Court, it is necessary
to review the Sixth Circuit's decision to uphold Ohio's personal
property tax exemption in comparison to its invalidation of the
Ohio ITC. Ohio code allows municipalities to offer certain incen-
tives to a business that "agrees to establish, expand, renovate, or
occupy a facility and hire new employees, or preserve employment
opportunities for existing employees" in areas designated as eco-
nomically depressed." 3 The Cuno plaintiffs argued that the tax
exemption was discriminatory because taxpayers who did not
want to locate within enterprise zones were treated less preferen-
tially compared to taxpayers who did locate within such areas."'
The Sixth Circuit held that the conditions the property tax ex-
emption placed on a potential taxpayer may have been unconsti-
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Philip M. Tatarowicz & Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde, An Analytical Ap-
proach to State Tax Discrimination Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REV. 879,
929 (1986) ("[Tlhe key to finding a tax incentive unconstitutionally discriminatory appears
to be a reliance by the state tax provision on both a taxpayer's in-state and out-of-state
activities in determining the taxpayer's effective tax rate. Such a provision clearly has a
negative impact on interstate commerce. A provision that relies exclusively on a taxpayer's
in-state activities in determining an effective tax rate, however, arguably does not have a
negative effect on interstate commerce.")). It is important to note that the authors of this
analysis of the constitutionality of state tax incentives did not have the Supreme Court's
opinion in New Energy to evaluate, a decision which bolstered rather than retreated from
the core tenets of nondiscrimination and the Commerce Clause.
111. 386 F.3d at 741.
112. See id. at 746.
113. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.62(C)(1) (LexisNexis 2005).
114. 386 F.3d at 746.
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tutional independently, but the exemptions are not discrimina-
tory if they do not require the taxpayer to "engage in another
form of business in order to receive the benefit or [are] limited to
businesses with a specified economic presence."11
The Sixth Circuit relied upon a recent Supreme Court case,
Camps Newfound/ Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,"6 which
called on the Court to decide "whether an otherwise generally ap-
plicable state property tax violates the Commerce Clause ... be-
cause its exemption for property owned by charitable institutions
excludes organizations operated principally for the benefit of non-
residents."" 7 In that case, a Maine nonprofit corporation that ran
a summer camp for children who follow Christian Science sued
the Town of Harrison because it could not reap the benefit of the
property tax exemption due to the fact that most of its campers
were nonresidents." ' In a 5-4 decision," 9 the Supreme Court held
that the property tax exemption was unconstitutional because it
"distinguishe[d] between entities that serve a principally inter-
state clientele and those that primarily serve an intrastate mar-
ket, singling out camps that serve mostly in-staters for beneficial
tax treatment, and penalizing those camps that do a principally
interstate business." 2 ' Unlike those in place in the tax exemption
of Camps Newfound, the conditions of Ohio's property tax exemp-
tion were "related to the use or location of the property itself' and
therefore constitutional.'2 '
115. Id.
116. 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
117. Id. at 567.
118. Id. at 567-69.
119. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, and Breyer. Id. at 566. Two dissents were filed. Id. Justice Thomas filed a dissent,
id., which will be discussed in Part V.A. Justice Scalia filed the second dissent, joined by
Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. Justice Scalia argued that the Court had
read the dormant Commerce Clause too broadly. See id. at 595-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Scalia suggests that there may be a need to form other exceptions to the dormant Com-
merce Clause other than "market participant" or "subsidy" exceptions. Id. at 608 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, Maine's tax exemption policy "has nothing to
do with economic protectionism" and should be "beyond scrutiny under the negative Com-
merce Clause." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 576.
121. Cuno, 386 F.3d at 746.
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B. Analysis of the Sixth Circuit Opinion
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Cuno was correctly reached. The
dormant Commerce Clause has been frequently assailed over the
years. Sometimes, courts interpreting the doctrine have reached
odd and contradictory conclusions. However, in its jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court has always stated that dormant Commerce
Clause questions require a case-by-case analysis. 122 Despite the
fact that this case-by-case analysis is undertaken to avert any
adherence to "rigid formalism," the Court's decisions have consis-
tently reinforced certain principles as being fundamental to the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
The dormant Commerce Clause exists to prevent "economic
protectionism."'23 To "'create [and maintain] an area of free trade
among the several states,"'124 the Supreme Court has consistently
invalidated tax incentives that "'provid[e] a direct commercial ad-
vantage"'1 25 to in-state business activity. 26 It is true that the Su-
preme Court has often said that competition among the states is
"a central element of our free-trade policy."127 But this does not
permit states to undertake any and all competitive economic poli-
cies. Instead, the Court has steadfastly held on to the principle
that "[sitate laws that discriminate against interstate commerce
face 'a virtually per se rule of invalidity.""2 Because the Court
has invalidated a number of tax incentives, different in target
and purpose, the argument that the dormant Commerce Clause
122. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994) ("Our Commerce
Clause jurisprudence is not so rigid as to be controlled by the form by which a State erects
barriers to commerce. Rather our cases have eschewed formalism for a sensitive, case-by-
case analysis of purposes and effects."); see also Westinghouse Electric, 466 U.S. at 403;
Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 329. On the other hand, there is another interpretation of
this case-by-case approach. See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co., 358 U.S. at 457("That there is a 'need for clearing up the tangled underbrush of past cases' with reference
to the taxing power of the States is a concomitant to the negative approach resulting from
a case-by-case resolution of "'the extremely limited restrictions that the Constitution
places upon the states.'" (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940))).
123. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 192; New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 274.
124. Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 328 (quoting McLean v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322
U.S. 327, 330 (1944)).
125. Id. at 329.
126. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981); Boston Stock Exch., 429
U.S. at 329.
127. Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272 (1984).
128. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1897 (2005) (quoting Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
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requires narrow interpretation, one only prohibiting those incen-
tives that "function like a tariff by placing a higher tax upon out-
of-state business or products"129 and those that rely on "both the
taxpayer's in-state and out-of-state activities to determine the
taxpayer's effective tax rate,"130 misreads the Court's jurispru-
dence. To presume otherwise would allow form to trump sub-
stance, and permit lawmakers to craft tax policies that would
pass Constitutional muster while having a discriminating eco-
nomic impact.
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit's application of Supreme Court
precedent is a logical one. If a company, already located in Ohio,
is looking to expand its business, it has the world available to it
to decide where to invest. When making its decision, the company
will examine, as DaimlerChrysler did, the Ohio ITC, which says
that it can receive a tax credit only if it chooses to expand within
the state. DaimlerChrysler's choice to stay was not "made solely
on the basis of nontax criteria."13 Thus, the ITC "forecloses tax-
neutral decisions." '32 The investment tax credit uses the tax ma-
chinery of the state to coerce a business into expanding within its
129. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 745 (6th Cir. 2004). Although the
investment tax credit is not a tariff, the prohibition of these types of duties is instructive
when deciding which types of tax credits are unconstitutional. A protective tariff, which
the Court has described as the "paradigmatic example of a law discriminating against in-
terstate commerce," is simply a trade mechanism that "taxes goods imported from other
States, but does not tax similar products produced in State." West Lynn Creamery, 512
U.S. at 193. The Supreme Court stated that a tariff is "patently unconstitutional" and
"violates the principle of the unitary national market by handicapping out-of-state com-
petitors, thus artificially encouraging in-state production even when the same goods could
be produced at lower cost in other States." Id.
130. Cuno, 386 F.3d at 745.
131. Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 331. Professor Peter Enrich, counsel for the Cuno
plaintiffs, argues that the dormant Commerce Clause's nondiscrimination principle should
be focused on "whether a particular tax provision distorts economic decisionmaking in fa-
vor of in-state activity, not whether it treats in-state and out-of-state actors disparately."
Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 456 (1996). Professor Edward
Zelinksy, however, cautions that reliance on the distortion test may effectively deem "any
state tax provision discriminatory because any such provision may cause a business to in-
vest in-state rather than out of state." Edward A. Zelinksy, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler: A
Critique, TAx NOTES TODAY, Oct. 11, 2004, available at 2004 TNT 198-45 (LEXIS).
132. Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 331. But see Matt Kitchen, Comment, The Ohio
Investment Tax Credit: Impermissible Burden or Necessary Benefit? Cuno v. Daim-
lerChrsyler, Inc., 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1685, 1697-1700 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme
Court's tax-neutrality language should be read more forgivingly than the Sixth Circuit did
in Cuno).
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borders. Therefore, the Ohio ITC discriminates against interstate
commerce and is unconstitutional. 133
V. CUNO'S IMPACT ON THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
AND THE USE OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
When the Supreme Court decides Cuno, it may be deciding
more than just the constitutionality of the Ohio ITC. The breadth
of the case's impact will depend on what direction the Court
takes. Will the Court limit its decision to investment tax credits
or will it issue a sweeping opinion that serves as an edict for the
constitutionality of economic incentives? The Supreme Court's
previous cases have shown that the Court opts for a case-by-case
analysis.'34 It is not likely, therefore, that the Court's decision will
reach beyond the set of tax incentives in dispute in Cuno. Even a
narrow decision by the Court could have a wide impact on state
taxation and economic policy. This section analyzes the possible
impacts the decision may have on the dormant Commerce Clause
and economic incentives.
A. An Opportunity to Redefine or Reject the Dormant Commerce
Clause?
Critics of the dormant Commerce Clause have attacked it from
many angles. 35 Some commentators have called for a major re-
definition of the dormant Commerce Clause to remedy the "con-
fused mishmash of elite opinion" the Supreme Court has pro-
duced in the area. 36 Others have argued that it is time for a
complete rejection of the doctrine because it has "served its his-
toric purpose, to create a single common market of the United
States.'37 With two new Justices on the bench, predicting what
133. Professor Hellerstein has arrived at the same conclusion from his review of Cuno
and earlier Supreme Court cases. See Hearing, supra note 37, at 27 (statement of Profes-
sor Walter Hellerstein).
134. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
135. One commentator, in the parlance of our times, has even likened the dormant
Commerce Clause to "the Voldemort of American constitutional law, a dastardly doctrine
with no basis in the text of the Constitution." Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Con-
gressional Acquiescence and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1764
(2004).
136. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1923 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
137. Edward Zelinky, Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause: The Case for Aban-
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the Supreme Court will do in Cuno involves more guesswork than
usual for legal prognosticators. Although the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion in Cuno was one that was logically reached by application of
the Supreme Court's precedent, it will be interesting to see
whether the Roberts Court steadfastly applies the reasoning of
prior state tax cases or whether it adds another wrinkle to the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. If the Court's decision in
Cuno follows the second of these scenarios, it is likely that Justice
Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas wielded great influ-
ence over their colleagues.
Justice Thomas has been the Court's sharpest critic of the
dormant Commerce Clause. In his dissent in Camps Newfound,
he echoed the typical rhetoric of the doctrine's detractors, arguing
that "[t]he negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of
the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually
unworkable in application." 3 ' Instead of recognizing the dormant
Commerce Clause, Justice Thomas might find the principle of
nondiscrimination elsewhere in the Constitution. In his dissent,
Justice Thomas stated he would not apply the Commerce Clause
in the case, but would instead "consider restoring the original
Import-Export Clause check on discriminatory state taxation to
what appears to be its proper role."'39 Even with two new Justices
on the bench, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will embark
on a bold doctrinal journey that would endorse Justice Thomas's
position on the dormant Commerce Clause. Eventually, a textual
reading of the Commerce Clause may emerge among a majority of
the Justices, but even then, the Court would be hard-pressed to
overturn a doctrine that is characterized as settled law.
Never coy about assailing the Supreme Court's dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence, 40 Justice Antonin Scalia has been
doning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 29, 29 (2002).
138. 520 U.S. at 610 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Michigan
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that
the dormant Commerce Clause "'cannot serve as a basis for striking down a state statute'")
(quoting Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 68 (2003))).
139. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 610. But see Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas,
The Import-Export Clause, and Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 155, 223 (1999) ("Adopting Justice Thomas's solution would, with almost no evidence
that the Framers would have approved, cut protection for interstate commerce against
discriminatory and parochial state legislation to the quick.").
140. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 125 S. Ct. at 2426 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I agree
with the Court that this fee does not violate the negative Commerce Clause. Unlike the
20061 1251
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
more calculated in his criticism of the doctrine. It was Scalia, af-
ter all, who authored the Court's unanimous opinion in New En-
ergy."' In that case, Scalia wrote that "[ilt has long been accepted
that the Commerce Clause . . .directly limits the power of the
States to discriminate against interstate commerce. This 'nega-
tive' aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protec-
tionism."42 Justice Scalia, too, engaged in a constitutional treas-
ure hunt, seeking text that would support the theory of
nondiscrimination where none can be found in the Commerce
Clause. In his dissent in Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington
State Dep't of Revenue, 4 1 Justice Scalia stated that he would not
expand the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, which he de-
scribed as a theory "acquired by a sort of intellectual adverse pos-
session,"" but would look to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause 4 ' to protect citizens from discrimination.'46 It is doubtful
that a majority on the Supreme Court will follow this rationale,
for it would be as stark a departure as sanctioning Justice Tho-
mas's alternative. If the Roberts Court is reluctant to apply the
dormant Commerce Clause or broaden it, it may adhere to Justice
Scalia's language in American Trucking Ass'ns v. Michigan Public
Service Comm'n, where Scalia suggested that he would vote
against a tax incentive if it "'facially discriminates against inter-
state commerce and [i] it is indistinguishable from a type of law
previously held unconstitutional.""47 Although academics are ea-
Court, I reach that determination without adverting to various tests from our wardrobe of
ever-changing negative Commerce Clause fashions."); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 201 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I look forward to the day
when Complete Auto will take its rightful place ... among the other useless and discarded
tools of our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.").
141. See supra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
142. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988).
143. 438 U.S. 232 (1987).
144. Id. at 265. In Tyler Pipe, the Supreme Court invalidated a Washington tax exemp-
tion "because it place[d] a tax burden upon manufacturers in Washington engaged in in-
terstate commerce from which local manufacturers selling locally are exempt." Id. at 253.
145. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
146. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE
L.J. 425, 446-55 (1982). But see Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 384, 414 (2003) (concluding that the "substitution of one [clause] for the other entails
losing both flexibility for Congress and the states, as well as substantial protection for in-
terstate commerce").
147. 125 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2005) (quoting West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S.
186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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ger to see the Supreme Court address the continuing necessity of
the dormant Commerce Clause and the doctrinal confusion its ju-
risprudence has created, the real issue is whether the Ohio ITC is
indistinguishable from those laws that the Supreme Court has
nullified in the past.
While the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals-without dissent-
found the Ohio ITC to be essentially indistinguishable from other
unconstitutional tax changes, it is unclear whether that the Su-
preme Court will reach a unanimous decision as it has in many
previous state tax cases. 4 ' This does not mean that the Court will
take a significant departure from its prior opinions. Both sides of
the tax incentive debate have advanced several arguments that
the Justices of the Supreme Court could find credible. Consider-
ing the language of the Court's prior decisions and the apparent
views of the sitting Justices, Cuno could be a close call. While
there is disagreement over the validity of the dormant Commerce
Clause and the consistency of its application, there is wide recog-
nition that certain principles, like nondiscrimination, are well
settled in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. 4 9 Whether the
Court invalidates or upholds the Ohio ITC, there is enough sup-
port on the bench to uphold these core principles.
B. The Impact on Economic Incentives
If the Supreme Court gives the State of Ohio relief on standing,
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cuno will be withdrawn. As a re-
sult, Ohio's ITC will stand until another legal challenge is
mounted by a party that has standing against a similar tax
credit. Unfortunately, this result means that the Ohio litigation,
which started more than five years ago, will turn out to have been
a terrible exercise of judicial economy. Ruling on standing is pref-
148. Though he testified that the Sixth Circuit applied the case law correctly in Cuno,
see supra note 133, Professor Hellerstein believes that the Roberts Court will reverse the
Sixth Circuit. See Marcia Coyle, High Court to Hear Challenge to Company Tax Breaks,
THE NATL L.J., Feb. 10, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp
?id=1139479513325.
149. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1908 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that if
the Michigan and New York laws concerned articles of commerce other than wine, the
"well settled Commerce Clause principles" would find the states' policies "patently inva-
lid"); C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389 (1994) ("It is well settled
that actions are within the domain of the Commerce Clause if they burden interstate
commerce or impede its free flow.").
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erable, some commentators believe, because the jurisprudence on
the dormant Commerce Clause is so complex, and because it is
improbable that the "case-by-case" approach the Court has taken
in the past will clarify the law any further should it decide to rule
on the merits in Cuno."' Nonetheless it is certain that the senti-
ment against economic incentives is so strong that lawsuits
against tax exemptions will be filed again, forcing courts to ad-
dress the scope of the doctrine of nondiscrimination as it relates
to tax incentives.
1. Pursuing the Legislative Option
Because it involves the dormant Commerce Clause, the Sixth
Circuit could only reach its decision in Cuno because Congress
had not spoken on the issue. The dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine prescribes that a "clearly unconstitutional, discriminatory
state law will be allowed if approved by Congress because Con-
gress has plenary power to regulate commerce among the
states." 5' This premise may seem especially odd since one of the
core justifications for the dormant Commerce Clause is that the
American economy functions best when barriers restricting inter-
state commerce are removed. 2 When Congress legislates on in-
terstate commerce regulation, other doctrines, separation of pow-
ers and federalism, prevail over the dormant Commerce Clause.
In those situations, the courts, as Justice Thomas opined in
Camps Newfound, may no longer engage in "policy-laden deci-
150. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Cuno and the Court: The Case for Minimalism, 4
GEO. J. L & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2006), (manuscript at 9-11) available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=839345 (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). Denning reaches this conclusion by
applying Professor Cass Sunstein's minimalism theory, arguing that Cuno is a case where
the courts "'know that they may be wrong, and they know too that even if they are right, a
broad, early ruling may have unfortunate systemic effects.'" Id. (manuscript at 9) (quoting
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
26-27 (1999)).
151. ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 429 (2d
ed. 2002). For example, the Supreme Court, in Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, held that it
could not apply the dormant Commerce Clause to Alabama's policy of taxing out-of-state
insurance companies at a higher rate than in-state companies because Congress had en-
acted the McCarran-Ferguson Act specifically to allow the practice. 470 U.S. 869, 880
(1985). A divided Court, however, did strike down the tax statute as violating the Equal
Protection Clause, holding that the state had not advanced any legitimate state interests
sought to be promoted by this discriminatory measure. Id. at 882-83.
152. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 151, at 403-04.
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sionmaking" by evaluating the bounds of state taxation of inter-
state commerce.
153
As such, Congress may step in to take this issue out of the Su-
preme Court's purview. After the Sixth Circuit's decision, Con-
gressional leaders took action, introducing a bill "[t]o authorize
the States (and subdivisions thereof), the District of Columbia,
territories, and possessions of the United States to provide cer-
tain tax incentives to any person for economic development pur-
poses."5 4 Under this bill, Congress would authorize "any State to
provide to any person for economic development purposes tax in-
centives that otherwise would be the cause or source of discrimi-
nation against interstate commerce under the Commerce
Clause."'55 The bill contained seven exceptions, which Senator
Voinovich, who was the governor that signed the Ohio ITC into
law, claimed were created "not to authorize those tax incentives
that truly discriminate against interstate commerce."156 After the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, the legislation was put on
hold, but it is likely that it will be pushed through Congress if the
Court upholds the lower court's decision.
Congress has the power to authorize this bill but that does not
mean that it should. Senator Voinovich's bill would accelerate the
so-called "race-to-the-bottom" among the states.'57 Although the
bill contains several exceptions crafted to codify Supreme Court
precedent in the area of state taxation, the language of the bill
remains open to interpretation and challenges by foes of economic
incentives. If jurists and academics find it difficult to reconcile
153. 520 U.S. 564, 620 (1977).
154. Economic Development Act of 2005, H.R. 2471, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
155. Id. § 2.
156. 151 Cong. Rec. S5445 (daily ed. May 18, 2005) (statement of Sen. Voinovich).
157. See MAZEROV, supra note 16, at 2 ("While 'state sovereignty' in tax policy is gener-
ally desirable as a matter of principle, states are not sovereign in any meaningful sense
when corporations are able to pit them against each other in ever-more-costly bidding
wars for the latest auto or computer assembly plant."). Although the specter of a Supreme
Court decision upholding Cuno has dissuaded some states from pursuing businesses with
huge incentive packages, other states have not lost a step in the race to attract business.
Last year, North Carolina offered computer manufacturer, Dell, Inc., over $280 million in
state and local incentives to best its neighbors, including Virginia, to land a new plant in
the state. See Michael Schroeder, States Pay Steep Price to Attract Industry: Local Taxpay-
ers, Small Businesses Bear the Burden, Say a Growing Chorus of Critics, WALL ST. J.,
June 29, 2005, at A4. The package included a plan that would give Dell $225 million in
income tax credits over fifteen years. Id. Although state officials considered the deal a big
success, many residents condemned the deal that would pay 1500 people an average sal-
ary of only $28,000. Id.
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the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, then it may
be impossible for Congress, with complete confidence, to spare
only those types of tax incentives that truly do not discriminate
against interstate commerce. 58 Furthermore, future litigants
may choose to attack the provisions of a counter-Cuno bill with
arguments built upon case law related to the Equal Protection
Clause, Due Process Clause, or other provisions of the Constitu-
tion.'59 Regardless of the hefty legal and economic arguments
against such legislation, the political pressures might be too great
for Congress to resist.'6 °
2. Or Moving Toward Subsidies?
If the Supreme Court strikes down the Ohio ITC, and Congress
does not act legislatively to overturn the decision, states may util-
ize, as Ohio already has,' 6 ' another controversial type of economic
incentive that is currently constitutional. Subsidies have been the
subject of much discussion in the academic community,'62 but the
158. As Professor Hellerstein reminded Congress, "[o]ne should not lose sight of the
fact that one person's 'economic development incentive' is another person's 'discriminatory
tax.'" Hearing, supra note 37, at 30 (statement of Professor Walter Hellerstein).
159. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 365-66 & n.6
(7th ed. 2004). These attacks may prove to be a much more difficult endeavor, however.
For example, the Cuno plaintiffs' Equal Protection argument failed because the Sixth Cir-
cuit found that the "purpose of the Ohio statutes-to encourage industrial development
and economic stimulation of the state's economically troubled areas-clearly has a reason-
able nexus to the tax provisions." 386 F.3d 738, 749 (6th Cir. 2004).
The Sixth Circuit differentiated Ward from Cuno, stating that in Ward, Alabama im-
posed a discriminatory tax "in order to promote domestic industry solely based on nonresi-
dent status." Id. On the contrary, Ohio's statutes were constitutional because the state-
made tax benefits were "equally available to domestic and foreign corporations and clas-
siflied] corporations on the basis of new investment in economically depressed areas." Id.
160. In his speech on the Senate floor, Sen. Voinovich stated: "If States choose to use
tax incentives to promote economic development, then that is not a violation of the inter-
state commerce clause, that's simply their choice. It is called federalism, and it should not
be thwarted by the courts." 151 Cong. Rec. S5445 (daily ed. May 15, 2005) (Statement of
Sen. Voinovich). He added: "The challenges that manufacturers and workers face today
are daunting but surmountable. The last thing we need, however, is an artificial legal
hurdle that threatens to trip us up." Id.
161. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 122.172-173 (LexisNexis 2005). In July 2005, the corpo-
rations in Ohio were able to take advantage of the new Ohio Manufacturing Machinery
and Equipment Investment Grant, created to replace the ITC. The new program uses the
same calculations as the ITC, but the incentive will be awarded in the form of a grant. See
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT, OHIO MANUFACTURING MACHINERY AND
INVESTMENT GRANT PROGRAM GUIDE, available at http://www.odod.state.oh.us/edd/itc/
M&ElnvestmentGrant SummaryupdatedChuck.pdf.
162. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
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Supreme Court has "never squarely confronted the constitutional-
ity" of incentives. 163 That is not to say that the Court has ignored
the topic of subsidies altogether.
In New Energy Company of Indiana v. Limbach, the Court held
that the Commerce Clause only prohibits discriminatory state ac-
tion "in connection with the State's regulation of interstate com-
merce." 164 The Court found that "Ed]irect subsidization of domestic
industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition."'65 This
means that the State of Ohio may give, for example, $1,000,000 in
grants to businesses but not the same amount in unconstitutional
tax credits for essentially the same purpose. This is an odd con-
clusion to reach, especially in light of the fact that the Supreme
Court has been persistent in striking state tax statutes that ap-
parently have the same economic effect as subsidies.'66 Though
New Energy provided little insight into the constitutionality of
subsidies, it left open an opportunity for the Court to fully ad-
dress subsidies in a subsequent case.
The Supreme Court had its chance six years later in West Lynn
Creamery v. Healy. 6' In West Lynn Creamery, the Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of a Massachusetts pricing order that
placed "an assessment on all fluid milk sold by [milk] dealers to
[state] retailers."'68 The pricing order required milk dealers'69 to
pay a monthly fee into the Massachusetts Dairy Equalization
Fund. 7 ° From the Fund, each state producer received a subsidy
107 YALE L.J. 965 (1998); Christopher R. Drahozal, On Tariffs v. Subsidies in Interstate
Trade: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1127 (1996); Note, Functional
Analysis, Subsidies, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1537 (1997).
163. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994).
164. 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
165. Id.
166. Cf Westinghouse Elec., 466 U.S. at 406-07 ("When a tax, on its face, is designed to
have discriminatory economic effects, the Court 'need not know how unequal the Tax is
before concluding that it unconstitutionally discriminates.'" (quoting Maryland v. Louisi-
ana, 451 U.S. 724, 760 (1951))); Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 334 n.13 ("IT]he Clause
protects out-of-state businesses from any discriminatory burden on their interstate com-
mercial activities.") (emphasis added).
167. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
168. Id. at 188. The pricing order was set in response to a commission finding that a
majority of the few dairy producers left in the state would go out of business within the
year if milk prices did not increase. Id. at 189.
169. Defined as "any person who is engaged within the Commonwealth in the business
of receiving, purchasing, pasteuruizing, bottling, distributing, or otherwise handling milk,
purchases or receives milk for sale as the consignee or agent of a producer." Id. at 190 n.4.
170. Id. at 188-91.
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equal to its "proportionate contribution to the State's total pro-
duction of raw milk."' 7 ' Two milk dealers licensed to do business
in Massachusetts brought suit against the state, claiming that
the pricing order violated the Commerce Clause.'72 The Court
stated that the payments made to the Fund were "effectively a
tax which makes milk produced out of State more expensive." '73
As a result, the Court held that the pricing order was unconstitu-
tional because its "purpose and its undisputed effect are to enable
higher cost Massachusetts dairy farmers to compete with lower
cost dairy farmers in other States.' 74
Massachusetts argued that its subsidy program was constitu-
tional because the payments were a nondiscriminatory tax and
that it could subsidize its farmers through the use of a permissi-
ble tax.'75 The Court rejected the idea that the subsidy program
was purely a "combination of two independently lawful regula-
tions."'76 On the contrary, the Court held that "[b]y conjoining a
tax and a subsidy, Massachusetts has created a program more
dangerous to interstate commerce than either part alone."177 The
rationale behind this decision is intriguing. The majority held
that the tax and subsidy arrangement meant that the Common-
wealth's political processes could "no longer be relied upon to pre-
vent legislative abuse, because one of the in-state interests which
would otherwise lobby against the tax has been mollified by the
subsidy."" '7 In other words, the lack of a "political check" on the
subsidy program doomed it.' 79 Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, dis-
agreed, stating that "[a]nalysis of interest group participation in
171. Id. at 191. There was an upper limit to the subsidy, however. Farmers that pro-
duced more than 200,000 pounds of milk were deemed to have produced only 200,000
pounds. Id. at 191 n.8.
172. 512 U.S. at 191.
173. Id. at 194. The fact that Massachusetts milk producers also made the payments
did not save the program because the effect on state producers was "entirely (indeed more
than) offset by the subsidy provided exclusively to Massachusetts dairy farmers." Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 198-99.
176. Id. at 198.
177. Id. at 199-200.
178. Id. at 200. The Court reasoned that the dairy farmers, milk dealers, and consum-
ers affected by the pricing order would have typically lobbied against the policy. The dairy
farmers, however, would advocate for the tax because they benefited from it. Id. at 200-01.
179. See id. at 200 n.17; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 159, at 321-22 ("The
phrase 'inner political check' refers to the fact that all local persons affected by local legis-
lation have the opportunity to participate in the democratic process that produces such
legislation.").
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the political process may serve many useful purposes, but serving
as a basis for interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause is not
one of them."8 ' Justifying different treatment of tax incentives
and subsidies based on political process grounds may seem ex-
traordinary considering the indistinguishable economic impact,'
18
but several commentators have supported this idea.'82
This "political check" theory commands that tax incentives are
"typically independent" of state budget processes, are "less politi-
cally visible" than subsidies, have indeterminate costs, and "do
not have to compete with other demands on state resources in the
appropriation process." 83 For these reasons, Professors Heller-
stein and Coenen argue that states should move toward subsidies
180. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 215 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, but disagreed on how the Court reached
its decision. Id. at 207 (Scalia, J., concurring). Although the Court did not consider the
constitutionality of subsidies, Justice Scalia argued that "a state subsidy would clearly be
invalid under any formulation of the Court's guiding principle." Id. at 208 (Scalia, J., con-
curring). Justice Scalia proposed that there were four measures that Massachusetts could
have taken to produce their intended effect:
(1) a discriminatory tax upon the industry, imposing a higher liability on out-
of-state members than on their in-state competitors; (2) a tax upon the indus-
try that is nondiscriminatory in its assessment, but that has an "exemption"
or "credit" for in-state members; (3) a nondiscriminatory tax upon the indus-
try, the revenues from which are placed into a segregated fund, which fund is
disbursed as "rebates" or "subsidies" to in-state members of the industry (the
situation at issue in this case); and (4) with or without nondiscriminatory
taxation of the industry, a subsidy for the in-state members of the industry,
funded from the State's general revenues.
Id. at 210 (Scalia, J., concurring). According to Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court's juris-
prudence clearly supports the notion that the first two measures are unconstitutional. Id.
at 210-11 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's rationale for concurring in the decision
was that the pricing order, in effect, was the third measure. See id. at 211 (Scalia, J., con-
curring). The only difference between the second and third measure was one of form, and
could therefore not be held constitutional. Id. at 210-11 (Scalia, J., concurring).
In addition, Justice Scalia believed that the fourth measure was "so far removed from
what we have hitherto held to be unconstitutional, that prohibiting it must be regarded as
an extension of our negative-Commerce-Clause jurisprudence and therefore, to me, unac-
ceptable." Id. at 211 (Scalia, J., concurring). Finally and perhaps most importantly, Jus-
tice Scalia noted that the Supreme Court had already approved subsidies even though the
Court had declared that it had not yet taken on the issue directly. Id. (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (citing Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809-10 (1976)).
181. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 14, at 868 ("[T]he economic consequences of
tax breaks and subsidies are often indistinguishable."). But see Zelinksy, supra note 137,
at 70-76.
182. See, e.g., Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 14, at 869 (arguing that the "considera-
tion of a subsidy forces the mind of the public body to consider most pointedly the cost and
consequences of moving forward"). But see Zelinsky, supra note 137, at 70-76.
183. Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66
TENN. L. REV. 687, 748-49 n.254 (1999) (quoting Enrich, supra note 131, at 442-43).
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and away from tax incentives because the former focuses "state
decisionmakers-and the voters to whom they are accountable-
on the costs and inequities that business development incentives
can engender."'' 4 Even though transparency of and accountability
in the political process are significant concerns,18 5 economic incen-
tives are so widespread and the fear of job loss is so great that it
is questionable whether the political check operates with any
force today.
For decades, the courts, following the Supreme Court's case
law, have struck down tax incentives that have burdened inter-
state commerce. These tax incentives were discriminatory and
placed barriers to a national marketplace. Meanwhile, the Court
passed on deciding the constitutionality of subsidies. As a result,
states have used enormous subsidies to attract business.186 For
scholars and legislators, this reality is controversial and confus-
ing. After all, the Supreme Court has taken the position that the
Constitution views two incentives completely differently even
though their effects might be the same. This peculiar notion
needs to be revisited. If the Roberts Court continues to take the
case-by-case approach in dealing with the dormant Commerce
Clause, the Justices will once again note the subsidy conundrum,
but pass on trying to solve it. 187
VI. CONCLUSION
Cuno is closely watched because the position the Supreme
Court takes will greatly affect the way states conduct business.
The case has highlighted the significant disagreement over the
role of tax incentives in attracting businesses to a region. At the
heart of this controversy is the dispute over the judiciary's role in
second-guessing the public policy decisions of state legislatures.
Even though the legislatures should decide which tax incentive is
best for their states, the Supreme Court cannot shy away from
evaluating and invalidating tax policies that discriminate against
interstate commerce. If it does withdraw its review of such eco-
184. Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 14, at 870.
185. See Coenen, supra note 162, at 998-1002.
186. See Good Jobs First, Largest Subsidy Deals, http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/corp
orate- subsidy/reference_ material.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
187. In fact, the Justices did not let the parties elude the subsidy issue during oral ar-
gument. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 26-27, 44-46.
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nomic policies, the Court risks allowing burdens to be placed on
the national marketplace, a condition hostile to the dormant
Commerce Clause.
At the same time, the Supreme Court can decide Cuno without
passing judgment on the efficacy of tax incentives. In Cuno, the
Supreme Court is considering the constitutionality of the Ohio
investment tax credit. The Cuno plaintiffs have not asked the
Court to extend its powers of review beyond those previously used
in prior state tax cases. In those prior cases, however, the Su-
preme Court left legislatures without clear guidance in crafting
constitutional tax incentives. Even worse, the Court's silence on
the issue of subsidies have placed its reasoning in many of those
cases on shaky ground, as the economic effects of subsidies and
unconstitutional tax incentives appear to be indistinguishable. In
this light, Cuno presents an opportunity for the Court to depart
from its usually narrow focused, case-by-case approach to the
dormant Commerce Clause in order to clarify the inconsistencies
in its jurisprudence.
Alternatively, Congress may legislate around Cuno and over-
rule the courts. Either way, it could be extremely difficult for the
Supreme Court or Congress to reconcile the apparent ambiguities
of this cloudy area of law. However, both Congress and the Court
must recognize that one rule shines through the haze of Supreme
Court's dormant Commerce Clause opinions-states may not use
their taxing power to coerce businesses into staying, expanding,
or locating within their boundaries.
S. Mohsin Reza
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